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I. Introduction 
It is estimated that in the year 2011 alone, 822,300 American males were diagnosed with 
some form of cancer.
1
  While cancer treatment undoubtedly has improved, achieving higher 
success rates for cancer patients, such treatment often yields its own set of health-related risks.
2
  
For instance, chemotherapy and radiation—two widely-prescribed forms of cancer treatment—
commonly cause damage to sex organs and, consequently, sterility in men.
3
  As a result, many 
men undergoing such treatment, who wish to later have the ability to father a child, often elect to 
bank, or store, their sperm before treatment begins.
4
  This practice offers sterile cancer survivors 
a viable and often equally-effective alternative for fathering a child, and allows many couples to 
fulfill their dream of starting a family.  However, in the unfortunate case where treatment is 
ineffective, and the male cancer patient does not survive, the use of his stored sperm to 
posthumously conceive a child can raise a host of legal issues.  One such issue, which, until 
recently, had divided the United States Courts of Appeal, involves the right of posthumously 
conceived children, or lack thereof, to collect child’s insurance benefits under the Social Security 
Act. 
The Social Security Act (or “the Act”), among other things, authorizes the payment of 
insurance benefits to dependent children of deceased wage-earners.
5
  However, because the Act 
fails to make clear the rights of children conceived posthumously,
6
 circuit courts addressing the 
issue had interpreted the Act and determined benefit eligibility inconsistently, leaving 
posthumously conceived children entirely dependent on a particular court’s interpretation.  
                                                 
 1 American Cancer Society, Cancer Facts & Figures 2011, AM. CANCER SOC’Y 4, 10 (2011), 
http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@epidemiologysurveilance/documents/document/acspc-029771.pdf. 
2 Reshma L. Mahtani, Male Sterility, CARING4CANCER (Aug. 15, 2010), 
https://www.caring4cancer.com/go/cancer/effects/lesscommon/sterility.htm. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012). 
6 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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Perhaps surprisingly, much of the dispute dividing the courts had centered around the issue of 
whether posthumously conceived children are considered “children” for purposes of benefit 
eligibility and how that determination should be made.  
While the United States Supreme Court has now resolved this question,
7
 the circuit courts 
that previously had addressed the issue generally adopted one of two positions.  The Fourth and 
Eighth Circuits had held that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)–(B) and (h)(3), 
posthumously conceived children must be able to inherit from the decedent under state intestacy 
law, or satisfy certain exceptions to that requirement, in order to qualify as “children” for 
insurance benefit purposes.
8
  The Third and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, had interpreted the 
statute broadly, taking the position that a couple’s undisputed natural children plainly fall within 
42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1)’s basic definition of “child,” thereby making the children eligible for 
child’s insurance benefits and their state intestacy rights irrelevant.9   
The issue of posthumously conceived children’s rights to child’s insurance benefits under 
the Social Security Act undoubtedly will become more and more relevant as reproductive 
technologies further advance and the number of children conceived posthumously continues to 
grow.  Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s resolution of the matter, this Comment articulates 
several reasons why, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court was correct in 
aligning with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits and interpreting the Social Security Act—at least as 
it is currently written—narrowly, thus allowing posthumously conceived children to qualify for 
child’s insurance benefits only if they can inherit from the deceased wage-earner under state 
intestacy law.  The Comment, however, goes on to suggest that, while perhaps consistent with 
                                                 
7 See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
8 Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 50–51 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012). 
9 Id. 
3 
principles of statutory interpretation, the current text of the statute is inconsistent with the 
legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage.  
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of modern reproductive technologies 
and posthumous conception.  Part III will discuss the Social Security Act, its history, and child’s 
insurance benefits under the Act.  Part IV will discuss the recently resolved circuit split regarding 
the issue of whether posthumously conceived children are entitled to child’s insurance benefits 
under the statute.  Part V will address why, pursuant to principles of statutory interpretation, the 
Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation of the Act, at least as it is currently written, correctly 
required courts to look to state intestacy law when determining an applicant’s “child” status for 
purposes of benefit eligibility.  Part VI will discuss the recent Supreme Court decision that 
resolved the circuit split over the issue of posthumously conceived children’s right to child’s 
insurance benefits.  Part VII will argue that although the Act, as it is currently written, has been 
construed correctly by the Supreme Court and Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the statute is poorly 
drafted and fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage.  
Lastly, Part VII will propose a solution to this dilemma—namely that Congress revisit and 
amend the Social Security Act so that it both corresponds with the Act’s legislative purpose and 
is clearer for courts tasked with interpreting it in the context of posthumously conceived 
children. 
II. Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Posthumous Conception 
Assisted reproductive technologies (“ART”) have allowed many couples, who would 
otherwise be precluded from doing so, to have biological children.
10
  Transforming the way 
society views reproduction as well as the reproductive lives of many couples, these various 
                                                 
10 Emily Galpern, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Overview And Perspective Using A Reproductive Justice 
Framework, CENTER FOR GENETICS AND SOC’Y, 1 (Dec. 2007), http://geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/ART.pdf. 
4 
technologies and techniques afford prospective parents not only the ability to have children, but 
also the ability to determine when they would like to have children.
11
  For this reason, ART are 
often utilized by men and women that are either terminally ill or at risk of becoming infertile, 
such as cancer patients receiving chemotherapy or radiation treatment.  Among other things, 
ART allow these men and women to retain their reproductive options post-treatment and even 
post-death.
12
    
While ART encompasses a variety of technologies that promote pregnancy;
13
 the most 
common in the posthumous conception context are cryopreservation, artificial insemination, and 
in vitro fertilization.  
a. Cryopreservation  
Commentators largely agree that the availability of ART primarily is attributed to the 
development of a process known as cryopreservation.
14
  Cryopreservation is the “process of 
slowly freezing bodily materials so that they can be used at a future date.”15  In the ART context, 
the procedure generally involves sperm, ova, or embryos—all of which can be frozen for 
extended periods until needed.
16
  Cryopreservation of these reproductive cells provides 
prospective parents the ability and luxury of postponing the decision to conceive to some later, 
more convenient time.
17
  
                                                 
11 Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security Survivor’s Benefits for 
Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 257 (1999). 
12 Galpern, supra note 10, at 10. 
13 Although this Comment will attempt to describe some of the many reproductive technologies available to 
prospective parents, an in-depth analysis of such technologies and techniques is beyond the scope of this paper.  
14 Banks, supra note 11, at 257; John Doroghazi, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart and Unanswered Questions About 
Social Security Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1597, 1600–01 (2005). 
15 Galpern, supra note 10, at 10. 
16 Id.  The cyropreservation of both sperm and embryos is a well-established practice.  Sperm was first frozen in 
1949, and it has been possible to freeze embryos since 1983.  EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 163–64 
(2001). 
17 Galpern, supra note 10, at 10. 
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Experts have determined that frozen sperm remains viable for at least ten years.
18
  Some 
experts believe it can remain viable for more than one-hundred years.
19
  As discussed in greater 
detail below, a man’s frozen sperm can later be thawed and used for insemination or to fertilize 
ova in vitro.
20
  For this reason, cryopreservation, when combined with reproductive procedures 
such as artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization, makes it possible for children to be 
conceived posthumously, i.e., after one (or both) biological parents is dead.
21
   
b. Artificial Insemination 
One of the earliest,
22
 simplest and least expensive techniques available to prospective 
parents is the process of artificial insemination (“AI”), which “refers to several different 
procedures, all of which involve inserting sperm into the female’s body.”23  Although all such 
procedures fall under the umbrella of “artificial insemination,” the processes differ with respect 
to whether sperm is placed in the woman’s vagina, uterus, cervix or fallopian tubes.24   While 
prospective couples may choose AI for a myriad of reasons, the practice is most frequently used 
“to combat male infertility,”25 that is, AI is primarily utilized to assist in reproduction “when a 
man has stored some of his sperm prior to undergoing medical treatment, such as chemotherapy, 
that will render him infertile.”26 
AI, which can be performed at home or in a more traditional medical setting, is regarded 
                                                 
18  Banks, supra note 11, at 270. 
19 Doroghazi, supra note 14, at 1601 (citing Jamie Rowsell, Stayin’ Alive Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance 
Rights, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 400, 401 (2003)). 
20 SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON & D. KELLY WEISBERG, ADOPTION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 267 (2009). 
21 Id. 
22 See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the process of artificial 
insemination has been performed on animals for centuries). 
23 Galpern, supra note 10, at 9. 
24 Id. 
25 Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous 
Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 549 (1996). 
26 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 164. 
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as a very simple procedure.
27
  On average, seven insemination attempts over 4.4 menstrual 
cycles are required to initiate pregnancy.
28
  To increase the couple’s likelihood of success, sperm 
is typically “washed” before it used, meaning it is separated from semen, dead or slow sperm, 
and/or any chemicals that may impair fertilization.
29
  In all, approximately forty percent of 
artificially inseminated women become pregnant.
30
  
While AI is particularly successful—due to the fact that it “mimics what happens during 
coital reproduction”31—success rates can vary depending on various factors such as the age of 
the woman; the means by which the sperm is inseminated; whether the sperm is “washed” or 
“unwashed;” the overall quality of the sperm; and whether AI is used in conjunction with 
hormonal drugs.
32
   
c. In Vitro Fertilization 
First successfully performed on a mouse ovum in 1958,
33
 in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) 
offers couples a last-resort alternative to coital reproduction.
34
  Because IVF tends to be highly 
invasive, women generally attempt other less-invasive methods of assisted reproduction before 
turning to IVF and related procedures.
35
  Nevertheless, it is estimated that one percent of children 
in the U.S.—often referred to as “test tube babies”—are born using IVF.36  The first IVF-
produced child was Louise Brown, born in England in 1978.
37
 
Unlike AI, IVF typically involves fertilization of the human egg, or ova, outside the 
                                                 
27 Galpern, supra note 10, at 9; Shah, supra note 25, at 549. 
28 Shah, supra note 25, at 549. 
29 Galpern, supra note 10, at 9. 
30 Shah, supra note 25, at 549 (citing Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of 
Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55, 58 (1994)). 
31 Id. 
32 Galpern, supra note 10, at 9. 
33 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 167 (citation omitted). 
34 Shah, supra note 25, at 549. 
35 Galpern, supra note 10, at 9. 
36 Id. 
37 Shah, supra note 25, at 549. 
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woman’s body.38  Specifically, during the IVF procedure, eggs are produced either during the 
woman’s natural menstrual cycle or with the assistance of a hormonal drug treatment, which 
stimulates egg production.
39
  The eggs are then removed from the woman, either 
laparoscopically or through transvaginal aspiration, and placed in a culture that allows them to 
further mature.
40
  After being mixed in a petri dish with either fresh sperm or thawed, 
cryogenetically frozen sperm, the eggs become fertilized.
41
  The fertilized ova—known as a 
preembryo—subsequently are inserted into either the woman’s uterus, cervix or fallopian tubes, 
or are frozen via cryopreservation for future use.
42
  It is estimated that one-half of IVF patients 
freeze and store their pre-embryos.
43
 
Each of the above reproduction methods, as well as others outside the scope of this 
Comment,
44
 has made posthumous conception possible.  Regardless of the specific method 
employed, however, the legal status of a child conceived by artificial means after either one or 
both parents have died remains largely unsettled.  Indeed, as noted above (and in further detail 
below) one important right at stake in the context of posthumous conception, until recently, had 
been posthumously conceived children’s right to child’s insurance benefits under the Social 
Security Act.  
III. Overview of the Social Security Act and Child’s Insurance Benefits  
The following sections provide an abbreviated history of the Social Security Act and 
                                                 
38 Id.; Galpern, supra note 10, at 9. 
39 Shah, supra note 25, at 549. 
40 Id. at 549–50; JACKSON, supra note 16, at 166. 
41 Shah, supra note 25, at 550; JACKSON, supra note 16, at 166. 
42 Shah, supra note 25, at 549; JACKSON, supra note 16, at 166. 
43 Shah, supra note 25, at 550. 
44 For example, gamete intrafallopian transfer―another variation of IVF where the woman’s egg and a large number 
of sperm are placed directly into the woman’s fallopian tubes rather than a petri dish.  It has been said that 
“[b]ecause fertilization occurs naturally in the fallopian tubes . . . it is assumed that the tube is ‘a better incubator 
than a Petri dish . . . .’”  Erica Howard-Potter, Beyond Our Conception: A Look at Children Born Posthumously 
Through Reproductive Technology and New York Intestacy Law, 14 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 23, 28 (2006) (citation 
omitted). 
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child’s insurance benefits.45 
a. An Overview of Social Security 
In the midst of the Industrial Revolution and Great Depression, and under the leadership 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
46
 Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 1935.
47
  The 
Act’s purpose was to provide monthly benefit payments, i.e., old-age insurance, to workers who 
had reached a certain age and met other established criteria.
48
  The Act, regarded as a “social 
insurance” program, “sought to address the long-range problem of economic security for the 
aged through a contributory system in which the workers . . . contributed to their own future 
retirement benefit[s] by making regular payments into a joint fund.”49  
b. Child’s Insurance Benefits 
In 1939, Congress amended the Social Security Act.
50
  Whereas the original Act provided 
only retirement benefits, and only to the primary worker,
51
 the 1939 Amendments added two 
new categories of benefits, one of which was “survivors benefits paid to the family in the event 
of the premature death of a covered worker.”52  These fundamental additions, among other 
things, “transformed Social Security from a retirement program for workers into a family-based 
                                                 
45 To some, the term “social security” encompasses “not only social insurance but also welfare programs generally.”  
ARTHUR ABRAHAM & DAVID L. KOPELMAN, FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY 3 (1979).  For those that subscribe to this 
interpretation, “social security” may include, among other things, “general assistance, old-age assistance, assistance 
to families with dependent children, public health programs, aid to the blind and disabled and vocational 
rehabilitation.”  Id.  Throughout this Comment, however, the term “social security” will be limited in scope to social 
insurance programs, specifically survivor’s insurance.  Other programs that may reasonably fall under the 
“umbrella” of social security are, for the most part, outside the ambit of this paper. 
46 Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last modified Jan. 10, 2013). 
47 Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012). 
48 ABRAHAM & KOPELMAN, supra note 45, at 3. 
49 Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 46. 
50 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957. 
51 MARGARET C. JASPER, SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 5 (2d ed. 2004). 
52 Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 46.  The term family, for these purposes, 
typically consists of the widows, children, and parents of the deceased worker.  ABRAHAM & KOPELMAN, supra note 
45, at 3. 
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economic security program.”53   
One particular provision of the 1939 Amendments, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
402(d), authorized the payment of “child’s insurance benefits” to the children of deceased 
workers.  The purpose of these benefits was “not to provide general welfare benefits, but to 
‘replace the support that the child would have received from his [parent] had the [parent] not 
died.’”54  
In order to be eligible for child’s insurance benefits today, a child must meet the criteria 
outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).
55
  Specifically, “the child or his guardian must have filed an 
application for child’s insurance benefits with the Social Security Administration.”56  The child 
must also satisfy other substantive criteria: the child must be “unmarried and either under certain 
age limits or subject to a disability,” and must have been “dependent upon [the insured decedent] 
. . . at the time of [the decedent’s] death . . . .”57  In a subsequent provision, the Act provides that 
“[a] child shall be deemed dependent upon [the insured decedent at the time of his death] unless, 
at such time, such individual was not living with or contributing to the support of such child” and 
either “such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual,” or “such child 
has been adopted by some other individual.”58 
Before even reaching these inquiries, however, an applicant, as a threshold matter, must 
establish something more fundamental: that he or she is the insured’s “child” within the meaning 
                                                 
53 Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 46. 
54 Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507–08, 514–15 
(1976); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Chater, 101 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the purpose of federal child 
insurance benefits is not to benefit minor children as such but . . . to replace the support that the child would have 
received from his father had the father not died.”). 
55 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957. 
56 Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(A)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 
(2012). 
57 Id. at 51–52 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B), (C)(ii)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (emphasis added). 
10 
of the Act.
59
  The Act’s basic grant of benefits provides that “[e]very child (as defined in section 
416(e) of this title) . . . of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual . . . shall 
be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit…”60  In pertinent part, section 416(e) of the Act defines 
the term “child” as “the child or legally adopted child of an individual.”61  However, admittedly 
“sparse,”62 if not completely ambiguous, section 416(e)’s definition of child has, until recently, 
sparked much debate in the context posthumously conceived children’s right to benefits under 
the Act. 
While some courts, such as the Third and Ninth Circuits, have found section 416(e) to 
provide a sufficient definition of “child” for purposes of determining benefit eligibility,63 other 
courts, like the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, as well as the Commissioner of the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”),64 have determined that subsequent provisions of the Act “bear[] on the 
determination of child status.”65   
Section 416 of the Act, entitled “Additional definitions,” includes subsection 416(h), 
entitled “Determination of family status,” which states in pertinent part:  
In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently insured 
individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall 
apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal 
property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the 
time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts 
of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured 
individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of 
Columbia.  Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to 
                                                 
59 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52. 
6042 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1). 
61 Id. § 416(e)(1). 
62 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52. 
63 See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
64 As is discussed in greater detail below, the Social Security Act gives the Commissioner of Social Security 
rulemaking authority.  Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (“The Commissioner of Social Security 
shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt 
reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and 
evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.”) 
65 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52. 
11 
taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.
66
 
 
In light of section 416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy requirement, the Commissioner of the SSA has 
interpreted the Act to provide that a child of a deceased wage earner is not entitled to benefits 
unless he or she has inheritance rights under state law or can satisfy certain additional statutory 
requirements.
67
  
For those children that cannot establish “child” status through section 416(h)(2)(A)’s 
intestacy provision, section 416(h) provides three additional gateways to benefits.
68
  First, 
pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B), an applicant who “is a son or daughter of a fully or currently 
insured individual,” but who cannot inherit from that individual under state intestacy law, is 
deemed a “child” if his or her parents went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported 
marriage that later turned out to be legally invalid.
69
  Second, a child who is unable to inherit 
from a deceased insured under state intestacy law is nevertheless deemed a “child” under the Act 
if, prior to death the insured wage-earner, the wage-earner had acknowledged parentage in 
writing; had been decreed the child’s parent by a court; or had “been ordered by a court to 
contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant [was the insured individual’s 
child].”70  Third, a child who is barred from inheriting under state intestacy law is nevertheless 
deemed a “child” if the insured decedent is shown by “evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner 
of Social Security” to have been the parent of the applicant, and to have been “living with or 
contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.”71 
                                                 
66 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
67 Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012). 
68 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52. 
69 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B); see also Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52. 
70 Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)–(III) (internal subsection divisions omitted); see also Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.  
71Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii); see also Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.  
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IV. Circuit Court Decisions Addressing Posthumously Conceived Children’s Right to 
Child’s Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act. 
As noted above, section 416(e)’s definition of child had created a divide among the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, particularly in the context of posthumously conceived 
children’s right to child’s insurance benefits under the Act.   
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,
72
 for instance, the Ninth Circuit—the first circuit court to 
consider the issue—held, among other things, that the provisions under section 416(h) of the Act 
“do not come into play for the purposes of determining whether a claimant is the “child” of a 
deceased wage earner unless parentage is in dispute.”73  In other words, where it can be shown 
that the claimant is the biological child of the deceased wage earner, i.e., that parentage is 
undisputed, the court need not look to section 416(h) or state intestacy laws to determine “child” 
status.
74
   
Similarly, in Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the Third Circuit held that the 
provisions under section 416(h) are relevant only “where a claimant’s status as a deceased wage-
earner’s child is in doubt,” and that the “term ‘child’ in § 416(e) requires no further definition 
when all parties agree” that the applicant is the “biological offspring” of the decedent.75  
In Schafer v. Astrue,
76
 the Fourth Circuit took a different approach than the Ninth and 
Third Circuits.  There, the court held that the SSA’s interpretation—that section 416(h) of the 
Act provides the analytical framework that must be followed in determining whether an applicant 
is a “child” for purposes of benefit eligibility—best reflects the Act’s history, text, structure, and 
purpose, and that “even if the agency’s interpretation were not the only reasonable one,” it is to 
                                                 
72 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
73 Id. at 595, 597 (emphasis added). 
74 Id. at 599. 
75 Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
76 641 F.3d 49. 
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be accorded deference.
77
 
In Beeler v. Astrue,
78
 the most recent circuit court case to address the issue, the Eighth 
Circuit similarly agreed with the SSA’s interpretation that “a natural child of the decedent is not 
entitled to benefits unless she has inheritance rights under state law or can satisfy certain 
additional statutory requirements.”79  Like the Fourth Circuit, the court noted that the 
Commissioner’s interpretation was, “at a minimum, reasonable and entitled to deference.”80  
With respect to posthumously conceived children specifically, the court held that section 
416(h)(2)(A) “clearly directs the Commissioner to determine the [child’s] status . . . by reference 
to state intestacy law.”81   
We now turn to an in-depth discussion of these critical appellate decisions. 
a. Ninth Circuit: Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart 
In December 1994, Robert Netting (“Netting”) was diagnosed with cancer.82  Doctors 
informed Netting that chemotherapy might render him sterile.
83
  As a result, prior to starting 
treatment, Netting decided to freeze and store his semen for later use by his wife, Rhonda Gillett-
Netting (“Gillett-Netting”).84 
In February 1995, Netting lost his battle with cancer.
85
  Prior to his death, however, 
Netting reiterated that he wanted his wife to have their child after his death using his frozen 
semen.
86
  Using in vitro fertilization, Gillett-Netting gave birth to two children in August 1996.
87
  
                                                 
77 Id. at 51–52. 
78 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012). 
79 Id. at 956. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 963. 
82 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 
S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 595. 
87 Id. 
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Approximately two weeks after giving birth, Gillett-Netting, on behalf of her two 
children, filed an application for Social Security child’s insurance benefits based on Netting’s 
earnings.
88
  The SSA denied the claim both initially and upon reconsideration, and Gillett-
Netting subsequently filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”).89 
Like the SSA, the ALJ denied Gillett-Netting’s claim, finding that the children were not 
entitled to benefits because they “were not dependent on Netting at the time of his death.”90  
Noting that the last possible time to determine whether one is dependent upon a wage-earner is 
the date of that wage-earner’s death, the ALJ held that “children conceived after the wage 
earner’s death cannot be deemed dependent on the wage earner.”91  Gillett-Netting subsequently 
filed a complaint in district court, claiming that the decision to deny her children child’s 
insurance benefits was not supported by substantial evidence, was not in accordance with the 
law, and denied them equal protection of the law.
92
 
Granting summary judgment in favor of the SSA, the district court held that Gillett-
Netting’s children did not qualify for child’s insurance benefits because they were not Netting’s 
“children” for purposes of the Act, and because they were not dependent upon Netting at the 
time of his death.
93
  The district court also held that the SSA’s denial of benefits did not violate 
the children’s right to equal protection.94  Gillett-Netting subsequently appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
95
 
 Recognizing that “no circuit court [had] previously considered the novel issue presented 
                                                 
88 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. (citing Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965–69 (D. Ariz. 2002)).  
94 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
95 Id. 
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in [the] case,” the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s decision to deny child’s 
insurance benefits to Gillett-Netting’s children.96  Stating that the Commissioner’s denial of 
benefits may be set aside “when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record,” the court began its analysis by noting that “[d]eveloping 
reproductive technology has outpaced federal and state laws, which currently do not address 
directly the legal issues created by posthumous conception.”97  The court further pointed out that 
“[n]either the Social Security Act nor the Arizona family law that is relevant to determining 
whether [Gillett-Netting’s children] have a right to child’s insurance benefits makes clear the 
rights of children conceived posthumously.”98  
 Turning first to the issue of whether Gillett-Netting’s posthumously conceived children 
were “children for purposes of the Act, the court recited the basic provisions of section 
402(d)(1).
99
  The court found that it was undisputed that Netting was fully insured when he died; 
that Gillett-Netting’s two children were Netting’s biological children as well as unmarried 
minors; and that Gillett-Netting had filed an application for insurance benefits on the children’s 
behalf.
100
  The court then referenced section 416(e)’s definition of “child,” asserting that the 
Social Security Act defines the term “child” broadly.101  The court noted that “[c]ourts and the 
SSA have interpreted the word ‘child’ used in the definition of ‘child’ to mean the natural, or 
biological, child of the insured.”102  Rejecting the SSA Commissioner and district court’s 
assertion that the term “child” is further defined by sections 416(h)(2) and (3), the court held that 
those sections of the Act were added merely “to provide various ways in which children could be 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 595–96. 
99 Id. at 596. 
100 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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entitled to benefits even if their parents were not married or their parentage was in dispute.”103 
The court also concluded that the provisions were irrelevant to the present issue because, while 
sections 416(h)(2) and (3) offer a means of establishing “child” status under the Act where the 
child’s parentage is disputed, “nothing in the statute suggests that a child must prove parentage 
under § 416(h) if [parentage] is not disputed.”104   
Thus, pointing out that the Commissioner had conceded that the children at issue were 
Netting’s biological children, and emphatically reiterating that the provisions under section 
416(h) “do not come into play for the purposes of determining whether a claimant is the “child” 
of a deceased wage earner unless parentage is in dispute,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
district court had erred when it held that Netting’s posthumously conceived children were not his 
“children” for purposes of the Act.105 
The court next turned to the issue of whether Gillett-Netting’s children, “the undisputed 
biological children of a deceased, insured individual, are statutorily deemed dependent on 
Netting without proof of actual dependency.”106  The court noted that, under the Act, “a claimant 
must show dependency on an insured wage earner in order to be entitled to child’s insurance 
benefits.”107  Agreeing with the district court that Netting’s posthumously conceived children 
were not in existence at the time of Netting’s death and, therefore, could not demonstrate actual 
dependency, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the Act statutorily deems broad categories of 
children to have been dependent on a deceased, insured parent without demonstrating actual 
dependency.”108   
Citing Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as section 402(d)(3) of the 
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 596–97 (emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 597 (emphasis added). 
106 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597–98.  
107 Id. at 598 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)). 
108 Id.  
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Act, the court noted, “[i]t is well-settled that all legitimate children automatically are considered 
to have been dependent on the insured individual, absent narrow circumstances not present in 
this case.”109  The court added that illegitimate children who prove parentage under sections 
416(h)(2) and (3) are similarly deemed to be the legitimate children of the insured decedent and, 
therefore, also are “deemed to have been dependent on the deceased wage earner.”110  The court 
subsequently proclaimed that the purpose of section 416(h) and its sub-provisions is not to prove 
parentage, but to prove dependency.
111
  Adding that “the Act is construed liberally to ensure that 
children are provided for financially after the death of a parent” and that “[d]ependency is a 
broad concept under the Act,” the court concluded that “the vast majority of children are 
statutorily deemed dependent on their deceased parents” and that “only completely 
unacknowledged, illegitimate children must prove actual dependency in order to be entitled to 
child’s insurance benefits.”112 
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, the court found that Gillett-Netting’s posthumously 
conceived children were “undisputedly Netting’s legitimate children under the law of the state in 
which they reside.”113  Explaining that Arizona had eliminated the status of illegitimacy, the 
court found that “[u]nder Arizona law, Netting would be treated as the natural parent of [Gillett-
Netting’s children] and would have a legal obligation to support them if he were alive, although 
they were conceived using in-vitro fertilization, because he is their biological father and was 
married to the mother of the children.”114  The court added that, although Arizona law does not 
specifically address posthumously conceived children, every child in the state—which 
necessarily includes Gillett-Netting’s children—is the legitimate child of his or her natural 
                                                 
109 Id. (emphasis added). 
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
112 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 598–99 . 
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parents.
115
 
 While the court again rejected the Commissioner’s contention that Gillett-Netting’s 
children were not “legitimate children” and, therefore, could not be deemed “dependent” under 
section 402(d)(3) unless they also were able to inherit from the decedent under state intestacy 
law (or one of the other provisions of section 416(h)), the court did point out that its holdings 
would not apply “[i]f the sperm donor had not been married to the mother.”116  Absent a marital 
relationship between the child’s parents, the court said, “no eligibility for benefits would exist 
unless the Commissioner made a determination that the claimant was the dependent child of the 
deceased wage earner for purposes of the Act by virtue of satisfying one of the requirements in § 
416(h).”117   
Despite its qualified holding, however, the court reiterated that “[w]hile § 416(h) 
provides alternative avenues for children to be deemed legitimate, nothing in the Act suggests 
that a child who is legitimate under state law [must separately] prove legitimacy under the 
Act.”118  The court observed that, as a practical matter, legitimate children typically will be able 
to inherit under state intestacy laws, but “they need not demonstrate their ability to do so in order 
to be entitled to child’s insurance benefits.”119  Opining that “[i]t would make little sense to 
require a child whose parents were married to demonstrate legitimacy by showing she meets a 
test set forth in § 416(h),” the court concluded that it need not consider whether Netting’s 
children could be deemed “dependent” for some other reason, such as their ability to inherit from 
Netting under Arizona intestacy laws.
120
 
Having determined that the posthumously conceived children were Netting’s legitimate 
                                                 
115 Id. at 599. 
116 Id. at 599 & n.7. 
117 Id. at 599 n.7. 
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children under Arizona law and, therefore, were deemed dependent on Netting under section 
402(d)(3) of the Act, the court held that the children were entitled to child’s insurance 
benefits.
121
 
b. Third Circuit: Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 
Robert Capato was diagnosed with esophageal cancer in August 1999.
122
  Soon thereafter, 
Mr. Capato was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile.
123
  Thus, Mr. 
Capato decided to freeze and store his sperm for future use so that he and his wife could retain 
their reproductive options post-treatment.
124
 
Mr. Capato’s health began deteriorating in 2011, and he passed away in March 2002.125  
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Capato (“Capato”) attempted in vitro fertilization using the stored, frozen 
sperm of her deceased husband.
126
  The procedure was successful, and Capato gave birth to twins 
in September 2003—eighteen months after Mr. Capato’s death.127 
The following month, Capato applied for child’s social security insurance benefits on 
behalf of her twins.
128
  The SSA, however, denied her claim.
129
  Capato subsequently requested a 
hearing before an ALJ, which was held in May 2007.
130
  But the ALJ also denied Capato’s 
request for benefits.
131
 
The ALJ found that Capato’s twins, conceived after the death of their father, were “not for 
Social Security purposes the ‘child(ren)’ of the deceased wage earner . . . under Florida state law 
                                                 
121 Id. at 599. 
122 Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
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as required by section [4]16(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act” and, therefore, were not entitled 
to child’s insurance benefits under the Act.132  The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and 
Capato subsequently appealed.
133
 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision to uphold the denial of 
benefits de novo.
134
  Citing Third Circuit precedent, the court noted that “[w]here the ALJ’s 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if 
we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”135 
Observing that the reproductive technologies at issue in the case “were not within the 
imagination, much less the contemplation, of Congress when the relevant sections of the [Social 
Security Act] came to be” and that “they present a host of difficult legal and even moral 
questions,”136 the court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he purpose of ‘federal child 
insurance benefits’ is not to provide general welfare benefits, but to replace the support that the 
child would have received from his father had the father not died.”137  The court further stated 
that “[t]he Act is to be accorded a liberal application in consonance with its remedial and 
humanitarian aims.”138 
After reciting the text of sections 416(h)(2) and (h)(3) and stating that 416(h)’s sub-
provisions merely offer “other ways by which to determine whether an applicant is a ‘child’” for 
purposes of the Act, the Third Circuit rejected the provisions’ applicability to the case at bar.139  
The court explained, “Were we to determine that the § 416(h)(2)(A) definition of ‘child’ is 
appropriate here and go on to apply the law of intestacy of Florida, as the Commissioner argues 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Capato, 631 F.3d at 628. 
135 Id. at 629 (citing Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
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we should, we would affirm [the denial of benefits].”140  However, the court added that “neither 
the Commissioner nor the District Court, who agreed with the Commissioner, ha[d] told [the 
court] why, in the factual circumstances of this case, where there is no family status to 
determine, [the court should] even refer to § 416(h).”141   
The court explained that to accept the Commissioner’s argument—that section 416(h) 
provides the analytical framework that courts must follow for determining whether a child is the 
insured’s “child” for purposes of benefits eligibility—“one would have to ignore the plain 
language of § 416(e) and find that the biological child of a married couple is not a ‘child’ within 
the meaning of § 402(d) unless that child can inherit under the intestacy laws of the domicile of 
the decedent.”142  Aligning itself with the Ninth Circuit, the court concluded that there was no 
reason for such an interpretation.
143
   
Pointing out that the Commissioner had conceded that Capato’s twins were her late 
husband’s biological children, the court cited Gillett-Netting for the proposition that section 
416(h)’s sub-provisions have “no relevance for determining whether a claimant is the ‘child’ of 
the deceased wage earner where parentage is not in dispute.”144  The court also noted that in 
response to Gillett-Netting, the Commissioner had issued an “Acquiescence Ruling,” limiting the 
application of Gillett-Netting to claims within the Ninth Circuit.
145
  In a “Statement as to How 
Gillett-Netting Differs From SSA’s Interpretation of the Social Act,” contained in the 
Acquiescence Ruling, the Commissioner argued that “in all cases, § 416(h) provides the 
                                                 
140 Capato, 631 F.3d at 630. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
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analytical framework that [courts] must follow for determining whether a child is the insured’s 
child for the purposes of section [416(e) ]” and that section “416(h)(2)(A) directs the application 
of state intestacy law or the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and 416(h)(3)(C) to 
determine whether a child is a ‘child.’”146  The Commissioner also asserted that “[a]n ‘after-
conceived’ child . . . cannot satisfy the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and 
416(h)(3)(C),” and, therefore, “to meet the definition of ‘child’ under the Act, an ‘after-
conceived’ child must be able to inherit under State law.”147 
 Rejecting the Commissioner’s argument that all children, “even including children of 
married parents whose parentage [is] not in dispute,” must satisfy “at least one of the provisions 
of section 416(h),” as well as the Commissioner’s justifications grounded in legislative history, 
the Third Circuit held that “[t]he plain language of §§ 402(d) and 416(e) provides a threshold 
basis for defining benefit eligibility” and that the provisions under section 416(h) are relevant 
only “where a claimant’s status as a deceased wage-earner’s child is in doubt.”148  The court 
explained that a basic tenet of statutory construction “is that in the absence of an indication to the 
contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning.”149  With respect to the Act, the court found that the “term ‘child’ in § 416(e) requires 
no further definition when all parties agree that the applicants here are the biological offspring of 
the Capatos.”150  The court, however, limited its holding to the facts of the present case, stating 
“[w]e acknowledge that another factual scenario might render the Commissioner’s concerns 
more persuasive.”151 
Emphatically concluding that the “undisputed biological children of a deceased wage 
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earner and his widow [are] ‘children’ within the meaning of the Act,” the court vacated the order 
of the district court in part and remanded for a determination of whether the children were 
dependent or deemed dependent on Mr. Capato at the time of his death.
152
 
c. Fourth Circuit: Schafer v. Astrue 
Four months after Don Schafer Jr. married Janice in June 1992, he was diagnosed with 
cancer.
153
   Like Mr. Netting and Mr. Capato, Mr. Schafer was told that the chemotherapy he 
required might render him sterile.
154
  As a result, he deposited sperm with a long-term storage 
facility.
155
  Mr. Schafer subsequently died of a heart attack in March 1993.
156
   
In April 1999, through the use of in vitro fertilization, Janice Schafer (“Schafer”) 
conceived a child.
157
  She gave birth to that child in January 2000.
158
  Although born 
approximately seven years after Mr. Schafer’s death, substantial evidence indicated that Mr. 
Schafer was the child’s biological father and that he intended for Schafer to use his stored sperm 
to conceive the child after his death.
159
  Mr. Schafer, however, never expressed his consent to be 
the legal father of the posthumously conceived child in writing.  
In 2004, Schafer, on behalf of her child, applied to the SSA for child’s insurance benefits 
under the Social Security Act.
160
  The ALJ initially awarded Schafer’s child the benefits she 
requested; however, the SSA’s Appeals Council subsequently reversed the decision, finding that 
the child was not a “child” for purposes of the Act because he was unable to inherit from Mr. 
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Schafer under Virginia intestacy law.
161
  The district court upheld the SSA’s denial of benefits, 
and Schafer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
162
 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit—before establishing the various criteria of section 
402(d)(1)—began by noting that an applicant seeking child’s insurance benefits under the Act 
must first establish something more fundamental: “that he is the insured’s ‘child’ within the 
meaning of the Act.”163  Asserting that “Section 416(e)(1) . . . is not the only provision of the Act 
that bears on the determination of child status,” the court observed that the SSA “has always 
required applicants claiming natural child status—including the undisputed biological children of 
married parents—to pass through one of § 416(h)’s pathways to secure that status.”164   
The court subsequently summarized the parties arguments.
165
  It noted that, under the 
SSA’s view, section 416(h) of the Act provides the “analytical framework” that must be 
followed in determining whether an applicant is a “child” for purposes of section 416(e)(1)’s 
definition.
166
  Moreover, posthumously conceived children are entitled to benefits only if they 
can inherit under state intestacy law.
167
  Thus, according to the SSA, Schafer’s child was entitled 
to child’s insurance benefits under the Act only if he could inherit from Mr. Schafer under 
Virginia intestacy law.
168
  Because Virginia law “does not recognize any child born more than 
ten months after the death of a parent as that parent’s child for intestacy purposes,” the SSA 
denied Schafer’s claim.169 
Citing Gillett-Netting, Schafer claimed that section 416(h)’s provisions do not apply to 
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children “whose parentage . . . is not disputed.”170  Schafer explained that “§ 402(d) refers 
explicitly to § 416(e), not § 416(h), in defining ‘child.’”171  Thus, under Schafer’s view, § 
416(e)(1)’s plain terms covered an undisputed biological child of the insured decedent and, 
therefore, her child’s ability to inherit from Mr. Schafer under Virginia intestacy law was 
irrelevant to determining his child status.
172
   
Addressing the parties “warring” interpretations, the court first engaged in a two-prong 
inquiry, derived from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984).
173
  The court first asked, as Chevron step one, “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”174  The court noted that if Congress has spoken directly 
to the precise question at issue, an agency “would not be free to counter Congress’s command, 
and the courts must uphold faithful interpretations and reject disobedient ones.”175  However, the 
court added that “where a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, a 
reviewing court at Chevron step two asks whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”176 
With respect to Chevron step one, the court concluded that, while the plain language of 
the statute is “the most reliable indicator of congressional intent,” and “the plain meaning of 
‘child’ in § 416(e)(1) might seem necessarily to include the biological children of those who, 
because of tragic circumstances, could only become parents after their death,” rejecting the 
SSA’s interpretation of the Act would be “unsound.”177  The court reasoned that the “traditional 
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tools of statutory construction” demonstrated that Congress intended for the SSA to use state 
intestacy law for purposes of determining “child” status under the Act.178  The court added that, 
even if Congress did not precisely speak to the question, “the SSA’s reasonable interpretation is 
entitled to deference”.179 
 The court next examined the pertinent provisions of the Act.
180
  Opining that “[s]ection 
416(e) itself is notably brief,” and observing that other circuits had found that the section’s 
“definitional tautology does not provide much guidance as to how the SSA should go about 
making th[e] child status determination,” the court concluded that Congress intended the SSA to 
apply the Act as it always had—by applying state intestacy law to determine child status and 
benefit eligibility.
181
  Moreover, the court noted that the Ninth and Third Circuits “have been 
willing to elevate the sparse definition found in § 416(e)(1) and to completely de-emphasize the 
more extensive definition found in § 416(h)(2)(A), thereby treating Congress’s more 
comprehensive efforts as a mere afterthought.”182  In doing so, the court added, these circuits had 
overlooked Congress’ “plain and explicit instruction on how the determination of child status 
should be made”—by applying “such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of 
intestate personal property.”183   
 Emphasizing that the term child “lies at the core of the Act’s benefit program,” the court 
commented that it would be “startling” if Congress had not provided “greater guidance on child 
status than set forth in § 416(e)(1).”184  The court also stated that the Gillett-Netting and Capato 
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courts’ contentions could not be correct.185  It reasoned that the Ninth and Third Circuits’ 
argument—that “because ‘child’ ordinarily means ‘natural child,’ § 416(e)(1) independently 
provides child status to those children whose natural, or biological parentage is not disputed”—
would “attribute inconsistent views about child status to . . . Congress.” 186  Observing that each 
sub-provision of section 416(h) requires an applicant for benefits to demonstrate both that the 
insured was the child’s biological parent and some additional condition, the court concluded that 
a showing of undisputed biological parentage could not be sufficient to establish child status 
under section 416(e)(1) because “it would have made no sense for Congress to require those 
whose parentage was initially disputed but was then resolved to prove something in addition to 
biological parentage.”187  The court explained that Congress would not have imposed an 
additional proof requirement on the undisputed child of the insured if undisputed biological 
parentage were sufficient under section 416(e)(1).
188
 
 The court also rejected the Ninth and Third Circuits’ attempt to add an additional 
requirement to section 416(e)(1).  According to the court, “Capato and Gillett–Netting 
alternatively hint that the class of children independently provided child status by § 416(e)(1) is 
comprised of the undisputed biological children of married parents.”189  The court responded by 
noting that “whatever their legal rights may be, out-of-wedlock children are indisputably the 
natural children of their biological parents under the ordinary English usage of the term.”190  
Therefore, the court said, “Capato and Gillett–Netting cannot state that § 416(e)(1) covers the 
children of only married couples without contradicting their earlier claim that § 416(e)(1)’s 
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supposedly obvious usage of ‘child’ meant all natural children.”191  The court also reiterated that 
section 416(h)(2)(A) contains no suggestion that it is limited to disputed or out-of-wedlock 
children.
192
  Instead, the provision “specifically addresses itself to the child status determination 
that must take place in evaluating every benefits application.”193 
 Finding that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act followed “to the letter Congress’s 
explicit and precise instruction as to how the agency should determine child status” and “makes 
sense of the statute as a whole” rather than “focusing myopically on a single term,” the Fourth 
Circuit held that the SSA’s view was “dutiful and faithful to Congress’s intent.”194 
The court also concluded that the SSA’s interpretation was consistent with the Act’s 
legislative history and Congress’ wishes, noting, among other things, that some version of 
section 416(h)(2)(A) has always been included in the Act’s statutory scheme—thus “weakening 
any inference that it is just a new way for disputed children to gain child status.” 195  The court 
observed that a detailed look at the Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress viewed section 
416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy provisions to be the “backbone of all child status determinations” and 
that “Congress understood the Act’s framework as requiring all natural children to pass through 
§ 416(h) to claim child status.”196   
Furthermore, the court determined that the SSA’s interpretation best comports with the 
purposes of the Act.
197
  The court stated that “[t]he Act is not a welfare program generally 
benefiting needy persons, but rather an effort to provide the . . . dependent members of [a wage 
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earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned by his loss of earnings.”198  The 
court recognized that the Act thus creates a “core beneficiary class”—“the children of deceased 
wage earners who relied on those earners for support”—and that “[t]he SSA’s interpretation, by 
tying natural child status determinations to one of § 416(h)’s pathways, [consequently] reflects 
the Act’s basic aim of primarily helping those children who lost support after the unanticipated 
death of a parent.”199  Although the Fourth Circuit found that posthumously conceived children 
differ from the core beneficiary class—primarily in that they necessarily could not have relied on 
the decedent’s wages prior to his death200—the court noted that the SSA’s interpretation 
“properly includes as children those posthumously conceived children whom state lawmakers 
conclude are similarly situated enough to more traditionally conceived children that they deserve 
a share in the decedent's estate.”201  
Finding that Schafer’s interpretation contravened the Act’s purpose by threatening the 
core beneficiary class and that “[t]he text, legislative history, purpose, and prior judicial 
approaches to the Act” supported its conclusion, the court held that Congress intended for the 
SSA to use state intestacy law in determining child status and benefit eligibility.
202
  
The court subsequently engaged in a Chevron step two analysis, inquiring as to whether 
the Act was silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue at bar and, if so, whether the 
SSA’s interpretation was based on a permissible construction of the statute.203  The court first 
determined that “[e]ven if one were to disagree that the Act dictates the SSA’s interpretation, the 
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considerable evidence for the SSA’s view at least demonstrates statutory ambiguity.”  Among 
other things, the court reasoned that “§ 416(h)(2)(A)’s clear instruction and comprehensive 
approach significantly undermines the view that § 402(d)’s basic grant and § 416(e)(1)’s sparse 
definition independently confer child status on undisputed children.”204  
Because the court found the Act to be at least ambiguous, it stated that it could not 
disturb the decision of an agency at Chevron step two “unless it was arbitrary or capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”205  Explaining that “deference of this sort stands 
at the heart of modern administrative law” and that it “ensures that agency officials, who . . . 
possess greater relevant expertise than judges, take the lead in implementing programs delegated 
to their care,” the court held that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act easily passed muster under 
Chevron.
206
  The court reasoned that the SSA “has extensive experience in administering the 
Act’s survivorship benefits program, as well as the legal and practical ability to respond more 
quickly to changing regulatory circumstances.”207  The court further reasoned that the SSA 
“faces political checks from Congress and the President, likely keeping its policymaking within 
the bounds of the democratically acceptable.”208  Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined that, at 
least in the present case, it would be “well advised to leave the fine-tuning of statutory regimes to 
others.”209  
In sum, the court—recognizing that “states have demonstrated a legislative willingness to 
account for the new biological world in which we find ourselves,” and that jettisoning the SSA’s 
approach would “thrust the federal courts into a myriad of other issues, including policy-driven 
questions about . . . child status”—held that it would not “disturb [the] long-lived effort at 
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federal-state cooperation, especially where the SSA’s construction of the Act seems not only 
permissible, but also correct.”210 
d. Eighth Circuit: Beeler v. Astrue 
Bruce and Patti Beeler were married in December 2000.
211
  Shortly before the wedding, 
however, Bruce was diagnosed with acute leukemia.
212
  Advised to undergo chemotherapy, but 
informed that such treatment could cause sterility, Bruce arranged to store his sperm at a fertility 
clinic so that he and his wife could later have children.
213
 
 In February 2001, after being hospitalized for an infection, Bruce turned his attention to 
the disposition of his banked sperm.
214
  Bruce signed a hospital form in which he bequeathed his 
sperm to Patti (or “Beeler”) and provided that only she could use the sperm in the event of 
Bruce’s death.215  Bruce and Patti also signed a hospital form providing that the couple desired 
Patti to be inseminated with Bruce’s sperm for the purpose of conceiving a child, and that Bruce 
accepted and acknowledged paternity and child support responsibilities for any resulting child.
216
  
Two days after signing the forms, Bruce underwent a bone marrow transplant, which was 
unsuccessful.
217
  Bruce passed away in May 2001.
218
 
 Approximately one year after her husband’s death, Beeler conceived a child after 
undergoing intra-uterine insemination.
219
  The child was born in April 2003.
220
  Bruce was listed 
as the father on the child’s birth certificate, and it was undisputed that the child was Bruce’s 
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biological daughter.
221
 
 In June 2003, Beeler applied for child’s insurance benefits on behalf of her daughter. 222  
However, the SSA ultimately denied the application as well as a request for reconsideration.
223
  
Beeler subsequently requested a hearing before an ALJ.
224
 
 Following a hearing in March 2008, the ALJ sent the case to the SSA’s Appeals Council 
with a recommendation that Beeler’s child was not entitled to benefits.225  The Appeals Council, 
“based on its review and application of the Act, regulations, rulings, and acquiescence rulings,” 
issued an decision determining that Beeler’s child was not Bruce’s “child” within the meaning of 
the Social Security Act and, therefore, was not entitled to benefits.
226
 
 In February 2009, Beeler sued the Commissioner of Social Security in district court, 
seeking a review of the SSA’s denial of child’s insurance benefits.227  The district court 
ultimately reversed the SSA’s decision, remanding the case to the agency with instructions to 
calculate and award benefits to Beeler’s child.228  The Commissioner subsequently appealed to 
the Eighth Circuit.
229
 
 Following a discussion regarding the history of the Social Security Act, its relevant 
provisions, and the criteria a child must satisfy in order to qualify for insurance benefits, the 
Eighth Circuit noted that it was undisputed that Bruce was fully insured at the time of his death; 
that an application for benefits had been filed on the child’s behalf; and that the child was 
                                                 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957. 
33 
unmarried and under eighteen years old.
230
  The court also acknowledged that the parties had 
agreed that if Beeler’s child qualified as a “child” under any provision of section 416(h), she 
automatically satisfied the Act’s dependency requirement.231  
 Observing that the parties’ dispute centered on the relationship between sections 416(e) 
and 416(h) of the Act, as well as various SSA regulations implementing those provisions, the 
court set forth the applicable standard of review.
232
  The court stated that it would review the 
district court’s decision de novo and would affirm the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “if 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole support[ed] the decision, and the Commissioner 
correctly applied the relevant legal standards.”233  The court further stated that whether the 
SSA’s position―that section 416(h) “is the exclusive means by which an applicant can qualify 
for ‘child’ status as a natural child within the meaning of § 416(e)”―is correct is a question of 
statutory interpretation and would also be reviewed de novo.
234
  
Like the Fourth Circuit, the court subsequently pointed out that “when Congress has 
delegated authority to an administrative agency to interpret and implement a federal statute,” the 
court gives “the agency’s interpretation deference pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.”235  Under Chevron, the court noted, an agency’s view “governs 
if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only possible interpretation, 
nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts.”236   
Noting that the Social Security regulations were established “pursuant to the 
Commissioner’s statutory authority to promulgate rules that are ‘necessary or appropriate to 
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carry out’ his functions and the relevant statutory provisions,” the court began examining those 
SSA regulations pertaining to “child” status.237  The court specifically highlighted 20 C.F.R. § 
404.355―entitled “Who is the insured’s natural child?”―which provides that “you may be 
eligible for benefits as the insured’s natural child if any of the following conditions is met.”238  
That statement, the court noted, “is followed by a list of four conditions for ‘natural child’ status 
that closely track the statutory criteria for ‘child’ status in § 416(h)(2)(A), § 416(h)(2)(B), and § 
416(h)(3).”239  The court observed that the regulations provide “different sets of qualifications 
for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and stepgrandchildren, who—unlike natural 
children—are not required to satisfy one of the relevant provisions of § 416(h).240  
The court next laid out the parties respective arguments.  It noted that, in the 
Commissioner’s view, “the [SSA’s] regulations confirm that an applicant can qualify as a natural 
‘child’ within the meaning of § 416(e) only by meeting one of the criteria outlined in § 
416(h).”241  In Beeler’s view, however, the relevant SSA regulation “does not exclude the 
possibility that ‘natural child’ status can be established by other means, such as an undisputed 
biological relationship,” because the “regulation says ‘you may be eligible for benefits as a 
natural child’ if certain conditions are met,” as opposed to stating that the four listed criteria are 
the exclusive means of acquiring “natural child” status.242   
Finding no latent ambiguity, the court determined that the regulations “make clear that 
the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the provisions of § 416(h) are the exclusive means by 
which an applicant can establish ‘child’ status under § 416(e) as a natural child.”243  The court 
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reasoned that it would not make sense for the SSA “to promulgate a regulation dedicated 
specifically to answering the key question—“Who is the insured’s natural child?”—and then to 
omit one prominent answer.”244  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the SSA used the phrase 
“may be eligible” for benefits because an applicant must also meet additional requirements with 
respect to dependency, age, and marital status in order to qualify for child insurance benefits.
245
 
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court also noted that, “[e]ven if there were a sliver of 
ambiguity in the regulations, an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is 
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”246  Thus, according to 
the court, the Commissioner’s interpretation easily passed muster and was entitled to Chevron 
deference.
247
   
Also finding that provisions of the agency’s policy manual did not conflict with the 
SSA’s longstanding position—that all children seeking benefits must attain “child” status “by 
satisfying the criteria outlined in § 416(h)(2)(A), § 416(h)(2)(B), or § 416(h)(3)”—the court next 
addressed whether the SSA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable.248  The court 
concluded that “[t]he text of the statutes favors the Commissioner’s position.”249  The court 
reasoned that “[o]n its face, § 416(h)(2)(A) clearly directs the Commissioner to determine the 
status of a posthumously conceived child by reference to state intestacy law” and that the text 
“could hardly be more clear.”250   
The court also rejected Beeler’s arguments that a biological child is necessarily a “child” 
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under section 416(e), and that section 416(h) was irrelevant to her child.
251
  The court reasoned 
that although sections 416(e) and 416(h) do not refer to one another, and section 402(d)(1) 
“requires an applicant to qualify as a ‘child’ ‘as defined in section 416(e)’” without mentioning 
section 416(h), these points were “insufficient to establish unambiguously that a posthumously 
conceived biological child is necessarily a ‘child’ under § 416(e).”252  This conclusion was 
fortified, the court said, because “Congress elsewhere required proof beyond undisputed 
biological parentage to obtain ‘child’ status under § 416(e),” such as in sections 416(h)(2)(B) and 
(h)(3)(C)(ii).
253
  Thus, the court concluded that if Beeler’s interpretation—that undisputed 
biological parentage alone is sufficient—were correct, “then the statutory provisions requiring 
more evidence in some cases would be superfluous.”254 
Lastly, the court rejected the Ninth and Third Circuit’s reading of the Act’s legislative 
history, as well as Beeler’s argument that her child qualified as a “child” under section 
416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I) of the Act.
255
   
Finding that the Social Security Act permits, if not requires, the SSA’s interpretation, the 
court held that, as the law now stands, “it resolves the question of eligibility for child’s insurance 
benefits by reference to state intestacy law.”256  The court concluded that the Commissioner’s 
denial of child’s insurance benefits “was supported by reasonable construction of the governing 
statutes and regulations, and by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.”257  Thus, the 
district court’s decision was reversed.258 
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V. The Letter of the Law 
In the context of posthumously conceived children, the Social Security Act, as it is 
currently written, should be construed as requiring courts to look to state intestacy law to 
determine “child” status for purposes of benefit eligibility.   
a. Why the Fourth and Eighth Circuits “Got It Right” 
The Ninth Circuit, in Gillett-Netting, asserted that the Social Security Act “defines ‘child’ 
broadly to include any [natural or biological] ‘child or legally adopted child of an individual,’” 
and that the following subsections merely were “added to the Act to provide various ways in 
which children could be entitled to benefits even if their parents were not married or their 
parentage was in dispute.”259  In fact, the court concluded that the sub-provisions have no 
relevance unless the child’s parentage is disputed.260 
The Third Circuit, in Capato, reached the same conclusion.
261
.  The court held that, so 
long as the benefit applicant is the biological offspring of the deceased wage earner and his or 
her widow, “[t]he term “child” in § 416(e) requires no further definition.”262  
The Ninth and Third Circuits’ interpretation, as the Supreme Court ultimately 
recognized,
263
 is flawed.  It implies that, even in the present era of developing reproductive 
technologies, the meaning of the word “child” is so self-evident that courts do not need help 
interpreting it.  This simply is not the case.  Even in the limited context of biological children of 
validly married parents, where there supposedly is “no family status to determine,”264 “child” 
status remains a hotly contested issue.  As even the Third Circuit acknowledged, “The use of 
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donor eggs, artificial insemination, and surrogate wombs could result in at least five potential 
parents.”265 
Furthermore, the Ninth and Third Circuits’ reading renders section 416(h) entirely 
superfluous.
266
  The Fourth Circuit presents perhaps the best illustration of this point, stating:  
In § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii), Congress provided child status to a child who cannot inherit but 
who can prove both that the insured was the child’s parent and that the insured was 
‘living with or contributing to’ the child at the time of death.  But if undisputed biological 
parentage is enough under § 416(e)(1), it would have made no sense for Congress to 
require those whose parentage was initially disputed but was then resolved to prove 
something in addition to biological parentage.267 
 
The court followed with a second illustration.  It noted that section 416(h)(2)(B) of the 
Act “grants child status to a non-inheriting child only if he or she is the son or daughter of [the] 
insured—demonstrating that parentage is no longer in dispute—and if his or her parents went 
through a legally invalid marriage ceremony.”268  Clearly, if undisputed biological parentage 
alone were sufficient, the statutory provisions requiring additional criteria to be satisfied would 
be unnecessary.
269
 
The Ninth and Third Circuits suggested that the class of children afforded “child” status 
by section 416(e)(1) is comprised specifically of the undisputed biological children of married 
parents.
270
  But this undermines the courts’ insistence that the plain English meaning of “child” 
drove their views, inasmuch as non-marital children are in fact children..
271
  Thus, the Ninth and 
Third Circuits’ interpretation is incorrect and should be rejected.  
While it is true that section 402(d) explicitly refers to section 416(e), not section 416(h), 
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in defining “child,” and that neither subsection refers to the other, this dilemma is more apparent 
than real.
272
  Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit asserted, “it is not at all unusual for Congress to refer 
explicitly only to one section even though some of that section’s terms are given their full import 
by another, unmentioned section.”273 
As the Fourth Circuit noted, the term “child” lies at the heart of the Act’s benefit 
program.
274
  For that reason, it would be particularly startling if Congress failed to provide 
further guidance on the issue of “child” status than that set forth in section 416(e)(1).275  
Thankfully, Congress did not leave courts in the dark about such a critical term.  The plain text 
of section 416(h) provides all the guidance that is needed. 
b. Section 416(h)(2)(A): The Primary, If Not Exclusive, Means By Which Posthumously 
Conceived Children May Qualify As “Children” Under the Act 
As noted above, all children applying for child’s insurance benefits must satisfy one of 
the four criteria of section 416(h) in order to attain “child” status under the Act.  However, the 
statute instructs courts to look first to state intestacy law in making “child” status determinations: 
“In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently insured individual for 
purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would 
be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State 
in which such insured individual . . . was domiciled at the time of his death . . . .”276  
While sections 416(h)(2)(B) and (h)(3) of the Act also provide gateways to “child” status, 
courts may apply these provisions only after applying state intestacy law, according to the text of 
the statute.  Section 416(h)(2)(B) states in relevant part, “If an applicant is a son or daughter of a 
fully or currently insured individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured 
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individual under subparagraph (A), such applicant shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child 
of such insured individual” if certain conditions are met.277  The provision, among other things, 
provides alternative pathways for children to qualify as “children” under the Act, even if they 
lack inheritance rights under state intestacy law.   
Similarly, section 416(h)(3) of the Act is to be applied only after both provisions of 
section 416(h)(2) have been tested.  Among other things, the provision states, “An applicant who 
is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual, but who is not (and is not deemed 
to be) the child of such insured individual under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall 
nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual” if certain conditions are 
met.
278
   
As the foregoing demonstrates, Congress clearly intended for the provisions of sections 
416(h)(2) and (h)(3) to be applied in the order in which they appear in the statute.  Nevertheless, 
and although a child technically can attain “child” status by satisfying any of the four criteria of 
section 416(h), section 416(h)(2)(A) may be the exclusive means by which posthumously 
conceived children can attain “child” status.  As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, because the 
insured parent of a posthumously conceived child, by definition, died prior to the child’s 
conception, parentage could not have been acknowledged, decreed, or ordered prior to the 
insured wage earner’s death.279  Thus, it is impossible for a posthumously conceived child to 
attain “child” status under sections 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(III) of the Act.  Likewise, because a 
posthumously conceived child—again, by definition—could not have been living with or 
receiving contributions from the decedent when the decedent passed away,
280
 it is impossible for 
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him or her to attain “child” status under section 416(h)(3)(C)(ii). 
Although it theoretically is possible for a posthumously conceived child to attain “child” 
status pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B)—as the child may be able to demonstrate (1) that 
parentage is undisputed, and (2) that his or her parents went through a legally invalid marriage 
ceremony—such a result is highly unlikely.  Not only, as the Third Circuit observed,281 might 
establishing undisputed parentage pose significant problems for posthumously conceived 
children, but twenty-first century marriage ceremonies in the U.S. rarely will be found to be 
legally invalid.  Moreover, even in the rare instance where a posthumously conceived child can 
establish the required elements of section 416(h)(2)(B), that child still will have to satisfy the 
provisions of section 402(d), which itself is no easy task.  Due to the difficulty a posthumously 
conceived child is likely to encounter in attempting to establish the criteria of sections 
416(h)(2)(B) and 402(d), attaining “child” status pursuant to these provisions is highly 
improbable.  
For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits were correct to hold, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, that the Act, as it currently is written, grants social security 
insurance benefits to posthumously conceived children only if they qualify as “children” under 
their respective state’s intestacy statutes.  
VI. The Supreme Court Aligns with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits 
 Granting certiorari on the issue in November 2011, the United States Supreme Court, in 
May 2012, once and for all resolved the question of whether posthumously conceived children 
“rank as ‘child[ren]’ under the Act’s definitional provisions” in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. 
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282
  The case, on appeal from the Third Circuit and once again focusing on Mr. and Mrs. 
Capato’s posthumously conceived twins, was decided unanimously.283   
 Upon acknowledging that “[t]he technology that made the twins’ conception and birth 
possible . . .was not contemplated by Congress when the relevant provisions of the Social 
Security Act . . . originated (1939) or were amended to read as they now do (1965),” the Court 
aligned with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits and held that the SSA’s reading of the statute—
entitling “biological children to benefits only if they qualify for inheritance from the decedent 
under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement”—is 
“better attuned to the statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the 
deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime.”  The Court further held that “even if the SSA’s 
longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction 
that garners the Court’s respect under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.”284 
 The Court reasoned that “[n]othing in § 416(e)’s tautological definition . . . suggests that 
Congress understood the word ‘child’ to refer only to the children of married parents,” and that 
“elsewhere in the Act, Congress expressly limited the category of children covered to offspring 
of a marital union.”285  Likewise, the Court noted that “marriage does not ever and always make 
the parentage of a child certain, nor does the absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child’s 
parentage is uncertain.”286 
 Rejecting the Third (and Ninth) Circuit’s interpretation, the Court further observed that 
section 416(e) fails to “indicate that Congress intended ‘biological’ parentage to be [a] 
                                                 
282 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
283 Id. at 2025.  For a detailed discussion of the facts and procedural history of the underlying case, see generally 
Capato, 631 F.3d 626. 
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prerequisite to ‘child’ status,” and that “laws directly addressing use of today’s assisted 
reproduction technology do not make biological parentage a universally determinative 
criterion.”287  Nevertheless, the Court added that even if it were to accept Capato’s proposed 
definition—“biological child of married parents”—it is far from obvious that Capato’s 
posthumously conceived twins would be covered.
288
  Indeed, “[u]nder Florida law, a marriage 
ends upon the death of a spouse,” the Court noted.289  Thus, “[i]f that law applie[d], rather than a 
court-declared preemptive federal law, the Capato twins, conceived after the death of their father, 
would not qualify as ‘marital’ children.”290 
 With respect to how section 416(h)(2)(A)’s instructions fit into the “child” status 
analysis, the Court reiterated Capato’s argument that section 416(e) lacks any cross-reference to 
section 416(h).
291
  The Court, however, emphasized that Capato “overlooks . . . that § 416(h) 
provides the crucial link.”292  The Court stated that  
[t]he ‘subchapter’ to which § 416(h) refers is Subchapter II of the Act, which spans §§ 
401 through 434.  Section 416(h)’s reference to ‘this subchapter’ thus includes both §§ 
402(d) and 416(e).  Having explicitly complemented § 416(e) by the definitional 
provisions contained in § 416(h), Congress had no need to place a redundant cross-
reference in § 416(e).293 
 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that “[r]eference to state law to determine an applicant’s status 
as a ‘child’ is anything but anomalous.,”294  Just the opposite, “[t]he Act commonly refers to 
state law on matters of family status.”295  The Court discovered that “as originally enacted, a 
single provision mandated the use of state intestacy law for ‘determining whether an applicant is 
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the . . . child . . . of [an] insured individual.”296  Similarly, the Court explained that “requiring all 
‘child’ applicants to qualify under state intestacy law installed a simple test, one that ensured 
benefits for persons plainly within the legislators’ contemplation, while avoiding congressional 
entanglement in the traditional state-law realm of family relations.”297 
 The Court also emphasized that “[t]he paths to receipt of benefits laid out in the Act and 
regulations . . . proceed from Congress’ perception of the core purpose of the legislation.”298  The 
Act’s aim, the court noted, “was not to create a program ‘generally benefiting needy persons’; it 
was, more particularly, to ‘provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with 
protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.’”299  Thus, 
according to the Court, “[r]eliance on state intestacy law to determine who is a ‘child’ . . . serves 
the Act’s driving objective.”300  To be sure, the court acknowledged, “the intestacy criterion 
yields benefits to some children outside the Act’s central concern.”301  Nonetheless, it was 
“Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generality of cases.”302 
 Additionally rejecting Capato’s Equal Protection claim,303 the Supreme Court held that 
section 416(h)(2)(A) . . . completes the definition of ‘child’ “for purposes of th[e] subchapter’ 
that includes § 416(e)(1).”304  The Court further concluded that “[t]he SSA’s interpretation of the 
relevant provisions, adhered to without deviation for many decades, is at least reasonable,” and, 
therefore, the agency’s reading—which the Court found to be neither arbitrary nor capricious—
                                                 
296 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2031. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. at 2032. 
299 Id. (citation omitted). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2032. 
303 The Court held that “[u]nder rational-basis review, the regime Congress adopted easily passes inspection.”  Id. at 
2033.  The Court reasoned that the “regime is ‘reasonably related to the government’s twin interests in [reserving] 
benefits [for] those children who have lost a parent’s support, and in using reasonable presumptions to minimize the 
administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case basis.’”  Id. (citations omitted). 
304 Id. 
45 
“is . . . entitled to th[e] Court’s deference under Chevron.”305  The Court thus reversed the Third 
Circuit’s ruling.306 
VII. Beyond the Letter of the Law 
 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits, as well as the Supreme Court, have construed the Social 
Security Act as it currently is written correctly.  That is, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
the Act technically should be interpreted as requiring courts to look to state intestacy law to 
determine “child” status.  Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the foregoing, this article contends 
that the statute is poorly drafted and fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative purpose 
underlying the Act’s passage.   
 As courts have recognized, the Social Security Act of 1935 was never intended to be a 
“welfare program generally benefiting needy persons,”307 but rather an effort to tackle head on 
the burgeoning problem of economic security for the elderly.
308
  Based primarily, if not 
exclusively, on the concept of social insurance, this contributory system—like many social 
insurance programs—was intended to provide economic security by “pooling risk assets from a 
large social group and providing income to those members of the group whose economic security 
[was] imperiled . . . by . . . cessation of work due to old age.”309   
 Although the Act was amended in 1939, expanding both coverage and benefits to retired 
workers, their spouses and children, and to survivors,
310
 the amendments’ purpose was not to 
provide general welfare benefits to the public,
311
 but to function as an insurance policy, 
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providing “protection to the [American] worker and to [dependent members of] his family 
against the loss of earning because of retirement . . . or death.”312  With respect to child’s 
insurance benefits specifically, the 1939 amendments sought to replace the support that a 
dependent child would have received from his or her parent had the parent not died.
313
  The 
drafters thus created a core beneficiary class: the children of deceased wage earners who 
depended on those earners for support.
314
 
While the Ninth and Third Circuits’ interpretation of the Act undoubtedly covered the 
members of this core beneficiary class, their approach, as the Fourth and Eighth Circuits 
observed, was over-inclusive and, therefore, overshot the legislative purpose underlying the 
Act’s passage.  As noted above, child’s insurance benefits were added to the Act not to provide 
general welfare assistance or subsidize parents’ decision to reproduce, but “to provide support to 
children who have lost ‘actual’ or ‘anticipated’ support.”315  The Act’s underlying purpose thus 
suggests that all benefit applicants should be required to demonstrate a level of actual 
dependency on the wage earner as a prerequisite to benefits.   
However, while “regularly-conceived,” biological children of married parents likely can 
satisfy this prerequisite—as they are alive prior to the wage earner’s death and, therefore, likely 
were dependent on the wage earner—the same cannot be said about posthumously conceived 
children.  As the Fourth Circuit aptly noted, posthumously conceived children, by definition, are 
not in existence at the time of the wage earner’s death and, therefore, “necessarily could not have 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, “benefits are paid only on the basis of work and earnings to individuals who have worked and earned and to 
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relied on the wage earner’s wages.”316  By awarding “child” status to any undisputedly biological 
child of married parents and automatically deeming these “legitimate” children dependent, the 
Ninth and Third Circuits’ interpretation, as the Fourth and Eighth Circuits observed, overlooked 
this critical point.  Indeed, overextending coverage to children outside the core beneficiary class, 
such as posthumously conceived children, treats child’s insurance benefits more akin to subsidies 
for parents’ reproductive plans or general welfare assistance than insurance for unexpected 
losses.  It therefore ignores the drafters’ aim of providing benefits primarily to those “who 
depended on the support of a wage-earner and lost that support due to the wage-earner’s 
death.”317   
 While the Supreme Court’s (and the Fourth and Eighth Circuits’) “solution” to this 
dilemma has been to interpret the Act as requiring benefit applicants to satisfy one of the 
provisions outlined in section 416(h) in order to claim “child” status, this approach, while 
perhaps correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, and certainly effective in reducing the 
number of eligible applicants, also is inconsistent with the Act’s legislative purpose, particularly 
in the context of posthumously conceived children. 
Indeed, section 416(h)(2)(A), which is the primary, if not exclusive, means by which 
posthumously conceived children can qualify as “children” under the Act, does not make the 
benefit applicant’s level of actual dependency on the deceased wage-earner, or lack thereof, the 
focal point of its inquiry.  Instead, the provision relies on state intestacy statutes in making 
“child” status determinations.  While this approach may provide a definitive answer as to 
whether or not an applicant is entitled to benefits—or at least an analytical framework to apply in 
making this determination—it is problematic.  In addition to the fact that intestacy laws may 
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differ in every state,
318
 leaving the decision as to whether or not benefit applicants attain benefits 
to state legislatures, the statutes are intended to reflect the presumed intent of a decedent who has 
not had an opportunity to draw up a will,
319
 not the policies underlying the Social Security Act 
and child’s insurance benefits.  The statutes thus do not consider whether a child was actually 
dependent on the decedent’s earnings.  As a result, a child who actually was dependent on the 
decedent but could not inherit pursuant to the intestacy laws of the state in which the wage earner 
died automatically may be denied financial support, contrary to the drafters’ aim of helping 
children who lost support after the unanticipated death of a parent.  To be sure, sections 
416(h)(2)(B) and (h)(3) of the Act attempt to address this problem and increase the number of 
applicants who are eligible for child’s insurance benefits.  However, for many of the reasons 
articulated by the Ninth and Third Circuits,
320
 even these provisions are lacking. 
Likewise, by relying on the presumed intent of the decedent, which intestacy laws seek to 
replicate, section 416(h)(2)(A) and the Supreme Court’s and Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ 
approach treats child’s insurance benefits not as what they are—insurance against the loss of 
actual or anticipated support due to a wage earner’s death—but rather as assets to be given away 
or withheld.  For this reason, the courts’ approach, again, is inconsistent with the Act’s 
legislative purpose.  Through taxes paid while employed, a wage earner essentially purchases an 
insurance policy, providing income for his dependents whose economic security is threatened by 
cessation of work due to his old age or death.  Upon the wage earner’s death, his dependent 
children, as beneficiaries of the wage earner’s death proceeds, are thus entitled to benefits—a 
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fact that many intestacy statutes may not consider.  
Like the Ninth and Third Circuits’ approach, the Supreme Court’s and Fourth and Eighth 
Circuits’ interpretation of the Act declines to make the benefit applicant’s level of actual 
dependency on the deceased wage-earner, or lack thereof, the focal point of the courts’ inquiry.  
However, this is not the courts’ fault.  Indeed, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, as well as the 
Supreme Court, as a matter of statutory interpretation, have construed the Social Security Act as 
it currently is written correctly.  The real issue—and this article’s central point— is that the 
statute is poorly drafted and fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying 
the Act’s passage.  
VIII. A Plea for Congress to Amend the Social Security Act So That It Is More Consistent 
with the Act’s Legislative Purpose and Clearer for Courts Tasked with Interpreting It 
in the Context of Posthumously Conceived Children.   
If the goal of Congress is to grant posthumously conceived children child’s insurance 
benefits and produce a statute that is consistent with the legislative purpose underlying its 
passage, the present text of the statute is inadequate.  As discussed above, the American social 
security system was based primarily, if not exclusively, on the theories of social insurance and 
dependency.  It, therefore, is only fitting that dependency lie at the core of any proposed solution 
Congress chooses to implement.   
One potential dependency-based solution, which would resolve the issues surrounding 
posthumously conceived children’s right to child’s insurance benefits, would require Congress to 
adopt and implement a statutory provision premised on a theory of vicarious dependency.
321
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Under this proposal, eligibility for child’s insurance benefits could be defined under section 
402(d)(1)(C) as follows: 
“Every child biologically or legally related to an individual entitled to old-age or 
disability insurance benefits, or to an individual who dies a fully insured individual, if 
such child . . . was dependent or vicariously dependent upon such individual . . . shall be 
entitled to a child’s insurance benefit…” 
 
Such a provision not only provides for most, if not all, of the “regularly-conceived” 
children currently provided for under sections 416(e) and (h) of the Act, it also allows 
posthumously conceived children to establish “dependency” and qualify for child’s insurance 
benefits without having to rely on inconsistent state intestacy laws, which may or may not allow 
for benefits.  The vicarious dependency provision accomplishes this result by automatically 
deeming a posthumously conceived child “dependent” on the deceased wage earner if that 
child’s surviving parent or legal guardian can establish that he or she was financially dependent 
on the deceased wage-earner at the time of his or her death.  For example, if it can be established 
that a deceased wage-earner is the biological or legal father of a posthumously conceived child, 
that child would be entitled to child’s insurance benefits if his or her surviving mother can 
establish that she was financially dependent on the deceased wage-earner at the time of his 
death.
322
  The fact that the child itself was not dependent on the wage-earner at the time of his 
death thus becomes irrelevant.  
While there are, perhaps, several problems with this proposal—for example, the 
posthumously conceived child of unmarried parents may not qualify for child’s insurance 
                                                                                                                                                             
other.  In addition, each participant in the relationship largely depends on the other for attaining the resources.  
In conditions of mutual care, the potential conflict over resources ideally tends to be minimized or cancelled, 
since self-interests are identical to the interests of the other.  The principle of need is appropriate in relations 
of vicarious dependency since one individual feels identical to the other and, in enabling the other to attain 
the desired resources, enhances both his or her own and the other’s sense of welfare.  Typical examples here 
are relations between parents and children or between spouses. 
Id. at 264. 
322 Where the posthumously conceived child’s biological parents were married prior to the death of the insured 
wage-earner, the surviving spouse almost always will be able to establish dependency.   
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benefits because his or her surviving parent may not have been financially dependent on the 
deceased wage earner at the time of his or her death
323—there are also many benefits.  For 
instance, the proposed solution makes the Act easier for courts to interpret and apply by 
eliminating a multitude of unnecessary and arguably conflicting sub-provisions.  In addition, by 
disregarding the written intent of the insured, i.e., instances where the decedent gave written 
consent to the use of his sperm, as well as state intestacy statutes—statutes that supposedly 
reflect the presumed intent of a decedent who has not had the opportunity to draw up a will, but 
do not reflect the policies and purposes underlying social security benefits—the proposal treats 
child’s insurance benefits as what they are, insurance for dependent children of deceased wage 
earners, rather than an asset to be given away or withheld.   
The proposal also protects a greater number of posthumously conceived children, as 
eliminating reliance on state intestacy law and permitting “dependency” to be satisfied 
vicariously undoubtedly affords more children access to benefits.  To be sure, children conceived 
with the egg/sperm of a deceased, anonymous donor likely would not be eligible for benefits, but 
this is consistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage.  Not only does denial 
of benefits in these instances prevent Social Security from becoming a general welfare system, it 
declines to award benefits where there was no expectation of support.
324
  What’s more, there still 
is likely to be a net increase in the number of posthumously conceived children who are eligible 
for benefits, even if some posthumously conceived children may be excluded. 
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Lastly, the proposal expands the definition of “family” to include non-traditional groups, 
which are becoming increasingly common in the twenty-first century.  For instance, the proposal 
allows a child to attain child’s insurance benefits regardless of whether he or she is conceived 
after the death of a parent, the biological child of a member of a same-sex marriage or civil 
union, or legally adopted, so long as he or she can establish actual or vicarious dependency on 
the deceased wage earner.  The proposal thus recognizes and supports the non-nuclear family.  
At a time when “modern artificial reproduction technologies currently allow for variations in the 
creation of child-parent relationships which are not solely dependent upon biology” and “the use 
of donor eggs, artificial insemination, and surrogate wombs could result in at least five potential 
parents,”325 this is particularly important.  Moreover, it is consistent with the Act’s remedial and 
humanitarian aims.
326
 
Although there likely are many ways to amend the Social Security Act to make it clearer 
for courts tasked with interpreting it in the context of posthumously conceived children, a 
dependency-based amendment best comports with and reflects the legislative purpose underlying 
the Act’s passage.  For this reason, this article recommends that Congress adopt and implement a 
statutory provision based on a theory of vicarious dependency.  Not only would such a provision 
render the Social Security Act easier to interpret and apply, it would also protect a greater 
number of posthumously conceived children, support non-traditional families, and deny benefits 
where no expectation of support exists. 
IX. Conclusion 
Although the Supreme Court has now resolved the question of whether posthumously 
conceived children are entitled to child’s insurance benefits under the Social Security Act and 
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how that determination is made, this issue sharply divided the U.S. Courts of Appeal for several 
years.  This should come as no surprise, however, given the Act’s ambiguity and the fact that 
many present-day reproductive technologies “were not within the imagination, much less the 
contemplation, of Congress when the relevant sections of the Act came to be.”327  While the 
Supreme Court ultimately deemed the Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation of the Act—
awarding “child” status to benefit applicants only if they can satisfy one of the criteria outlined in 
section 416(h)—correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is clear that neither the Ninth 
and Third Circuits’ nor the Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation of the Act is entirely 
consistent with the legislative purpose underlying the Act’s passage.  For this reason, Congress, 
which has the last word in determining the scope of survivorship benefits, should intervene, 
amending the Social Security Act so that it both corresponds with the Act’s legislative purpose 
and is clearer for courts tasked with interpreting it in the context of posthumously conceived 
children.  While Congress perhaps can accomplish this goal in many ways, adopting a 
dependency-based approach, such as a theory of vicarious dependency, would seem to comport 
best with the Act’s legislative purpose.  In any event, Congress should act promptly to ensure 
that posthumously conceived children—like “regularly-conceived” children—are adequately 
provided for.  
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